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Explore the main themes, entities and connections around Evolutionarily stable strategy. Start with the topic map, then use the sections below for research and deeper semantic analysis.

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History

Nature Journal of Theoretical Biology Evolution and the Theory of Games Madhav Gadgil Geoff Parker

25 related topics

Motivation

Solution concept Structure of the game Moves Payoffs Common knowledge

8 related topics

Nash equilibrium

Weak ESS Evolutionarily stable set Prisoner's dilemma Hawk-dove game Uncorrelated asymmetry

8 related topics

Overview

Strategy Population John Maynard Smith George R. Price Behavioural ecology

17 related topics

Key facts & relationships

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Example: Hawk-dove
Intersects with: Subgame perfect equilibrium, Trembling hand perfect equilibrium, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Proposed by: John Maynard Smith and George R. Price
Subset of: Nash equilibrium
Superset of: Stochastically stable equilibrium, Stable Strong Nash equilibrium
Used for: Biological modeling and Evolutionary game theory

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Overview

History

Nature Nature (journal)
Journal of Theoretical Biology
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Madhav Gadgil
Geoff Parker
Richard F. Shaw Richard F. Shaw?action=edit&redlink=1
James Dawson Mohler James Dawson Mohler?action=edit&redlink=1
Ideal free distribution
Stephen D. Fretwell Stephen D. Fretwell?action=edit&redlink=1
Henry L Lucas Henry L Lucas?action=edit&redlink=1
Robert Trivers
R. H. MacArthur Robert MacArthur
W. D. Hamilton
Sex ratios Sex ratio
Fisher's principle
Unbeatable strategy
Crafoord Prize
Richard Dawkins
The Selfish Gene
Social sciences
Robert Axelrod Robert Axelrod (political scientist)
The Evolution of Cooperation
Biological
Cultural evolution
Human biological evolution Human evolution

Motivation

Solution concept
Structure of the game Extensive form
Moves Move (game theory)
Payoffs Payoff (game theory)?action=edit&redlink=1
Common knowledge Common knowledge (logic)
Heritable
Fitness Fitness (biology)
Mutation

Nash equilibrium

Vs. evolutionarily stable state

Stochastic ESS

Bet-hedging Bet-hedging (biology)

Prisoner's dilemma

Human behavior

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Map overview Semantic statistics

Evolutionarily stable strategy

Nodes78

Edges77

Triples18

Avg. degree1.97

Density0.025641

Components1

How this topic connects Entity context

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Evolutionarily stable strategy

Top relations

related to Vs. evolutionarily stable state · 3

Evolutionarily stable strategy → ESS, In, Once

Example · 1

Evolutionarily stable strategy → Hawk-dove

Intersects with · 1

Evolutionarily stable strategy → Subgame perfect equilibrium, Trembling hand perfect equilibrium, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium

Proposed by · 1

Evolutionarily stable strategy → John Maynard Smith and George R. Price

Subset of · 1

Evolutionarily stable strategy → Nash equilibrium

Superset of · 1

Evolutionarily stable strategy → Stochastically stable equilibrium, Stable Strong Nash equilibrium

Used for · 1

Evolutionarily stable strategy → Biological modeling and Evolutionary game theory

Important terminology Word statistics

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Important terminology

ess strategy game nash stable strategies population equilibrium evolutionarily maynard theory smith price two players equilibria evolutionary evolution concept mutant

Entity relationships Subject–Predicate–Object triples

Subject	Predicate	Object	Confidence	Src
Evolutionarily stable strategy	Example	Hawk-dove	1.00	infobox
Evolutionarily stable strategy	Intersects with	Subgame perfect equilibrium, Trembling hand perfect equilibrium, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium	1.00	infobox
Evolutionarily stable strategy	Proposed by	John Maynard Smith and George R. Price	1.00	infobox
Evolutionarily stable strategy	Subset of	Nash equilibrium	1.00	infobox
Evolutionarily stable strategy	Superset of	Stochastically stable equilibrium, Stable Strong Nash equilibrium	1.00	infobox
Evolutionarily stable strategy	Used for	Biological modeling and Evolutionary game theory	1.00	infobox
anthropology	instance of	with applications in other fields	0.80	text
philosophy	instance of	with applications in other fields	0.80	text
political science.In game-theoretical terms	instance of	with applications in other fields	0.80	text
an ESS is an equilibrium refinement of the Nash equilibrium	instance of	with applications in other fields	0.80	text
being a Nash equilibrium that is also	instance of	with applications in other fields	0.80	text
a weak ESS or an evolutionarily stable set.Examples of differences between Nash equilibria	instance of	It also allows for a natural definition of related concepts	0.80	text

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